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WERNER

F.

EBKE*

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

The Limited Partnership
and Transnational
Combinations of Business Forms:
"Delaware Syndrome" Versus
European Community Law
The law of the European Economic Community (EEC) has brought
about numerous fundamental changes in the laws of the EEC Member
States. The recent German Druckhaus Landshut case illustrates its potentially great effect on the Member States' law of business associations. 1
In this case, the Court of Civil Appeals of Bavaria stated that it may be
permissible, under the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany, to use
an English private limited company as a general partner in a limited
partnership formed under German law. The court cited articles 52 and 58
of the EEC Treaty 2 to support its revolutionary holding. Reversing the
lower court's judgment and remanding the case for new trial, the court
reserved any decision on the permissibility of such arrangement until the
*Referendar (J.D.), 1977; Doktor der Rechte (S.J.D.), 1981; Habilitation, 1987, University
of Muenster School of Law; LL.M., 1978, University of California at Berkeley School of
Law (Boalt Hall). Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. Member,
New York Bar. Associate Editor-in-Chief, THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER.
I. Judgment of March 21, 1986, Oberstes Landesgericht (Court of Civil Appeals), Bavaria,
1986 Entscheidungen des Bayerischen Obersten Landesgerichts in Zivilsachen [Bay. OLGZ]
61. For a detailed discussion of this case, see Ebke, Die "auslaendische KapitalgeselIschaft
& Co. KG" und das europaeische Gemeinschaftsrecht, 16 ZEITSCHRIFT FUER UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 245, 246-70 (1987).
2. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
II [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. Article 52 of the EEC Treaty reads as follows:
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the freedom of
establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State
shall be progressively abolished in the course of the transitional period. Such progressive
abolition shall also extend to restrictions on the setting up of agencies, branches or
subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in the territory of any Member
State.
Freedom of establishment shall include the right to engage in and carry on non-wageearning activities and also to set up and manage enterprises and, in particular companies
within the meaning of Article 58, second paragraph, under the conditions laid down by
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issue is properly presented to it for determination. The court made it
perfectly clear, however, that it would refer the matter to the European
Court of Justice under article 177 of the EEC Treaty, if it had to decide
the question.

The issue of whether or not a foreign corporation can be a general
partner in a German domestic limited partnership was one of first impression. In an earlier case involving the same English company the Bavarian
Constitutional Court had passed on a related issue of choice of corporate
law. 3 That case, however, did not attempt to state a general standard for
determining when a foreign company is permitted to enter, as a general
partner, into a German limited partnership. The opinion of the Court of
Civil Appeals of Bavaria thus deserves the attention of international lawyers. This article concludes that the court's opinion is not free from doubt.
In a subsequent case the court itself substantially limited the scope of its
previous holding. In that case the court correctly stated that the entitlement of a company existing under the laws of an EEC Member State in
any EEC Member State to enjoy the freedom of establishment under
article 58 of the EEC Treaty and the rights the host country grants to its
own companies, is not available to a company when "all or almost all"
of its shareholders are residents of the host country and not of the state
4
of incorporation.
I. A Taste of History
As in the United States, 5 courts and commentators in Germany have
long differed over whether it is permissible, under German law, to form
the law of the country of establishment for its own nationals, subject to the provisions
of the Chapter relating to capital.
Article 58 of the EEC Treaty provides: "Companies constituted in accordance with the
law of a Member State and having their registered office, central management or main
establishment within the Community shall, for the purpose of applying the provisions of
this Chapter, be assimilated to natural persons being nationals of Member States." For
comments on these provisions see 2 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 2-535-46, 2-637-48 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
3. Judgment of Feb. 8, 1985, Verfassungsgerichtshof, Bavaria [VGH Bayern], 38 Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 2894 (1985); see also Judgment of July 7, 1985, Oberstes
Landesgericht (Court of Civil Appeals), Bavaria, 1985 Bay. OLGZ 272.
4. Judgment of Sept. 18, 1986, Oberstes Landesgericht, Bavaria, 40 WERTPAPIER-MITTEILUNGEN 1557, 1560 (1986).
5. See, e.g., Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 517 S.W.2d 420 (Civ. App. 1974), aff'd on
other grounds, 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975). But see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a,
§§ 2A, 8(b)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1987); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02(A)(18) (Vernon
Supp. 1987). For a fuller discussion, see Bromberg, Bateman, Hamilton, Lebowitz & Winship, Corporate General Partners, 16 BULL. OF SEC. ON CORP., BANK. & BUS. LAW (State
Bar of Texas), No. 1, Sept. 1978, at 24; R. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS 30-31 (3d ed. 1986);
REV. UNIFORM LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 101(5),
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 3.02(9)(1984).

VOL. 22, NO. I

101(11),

402(6), 402(9), (1985);

REV.

"DELAWARE SYNDROME" VS. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW

193

a limited partnership (Kommanditgesellschaft)where a legal entity such
as a public corporation (Aktiengesellschaft), a limited liability company
(Gesellschaft mit beschraenkter Haftung), or a foundation (Stiftung) is
the only general partner.6 Many commentators shared the view expressed
in a number of judicial decisions that it is inherently against public policy
to permit a corporation to enter into a limited partnership as a general
partner. In an article published at the close of the nineteenth century,
' 7
such a combination of business forms was criticized as a "legal monster.
The limited partnership with a corporate general partner did not receive
a great deal of attention until the first decade of the twentieth century. In
1906 and 1910, respectively, the States of Prussia and Bavaria changed
their corporate income tax laws. As a result of the new tax treatment of
corporations, most of the income of incorporated businesses was effectively taxed twice, that is, on the corporate level and on the shareholder
level. The double taxation made it more desirable to conduct business in
noncorporate forms, particularly in the form of a limited partnership. The
flip side of doing business in the form of a limited partnership, of course,
is the danger of unlimited personal liability. While in German law it is
fundamental that the shareholder is ordinarily protected from personal
liability arising from the activities of the corporation, the general partner
8
of a limited partnership is personally liable to creditors.
To minimize personal liability risks, corporate attorneys began to create
complex arrangements, of which the limited partnership with a corporate
general partner is but one example. In 1912 the Court of Civil Appeals
of Bavaria decided that a corporation may be a general partner in a limited
partnership. 9 One year later, the Court of Appeals of Berlin expressed
the same view.10 Not until the now famous decision of July 4, 1922, of
the Supreme Court of Germany was it finally settled, however, that it is
permissible, under German law, to form a limited partnership where a
corporation is the only general partner. I The court's opinion stands,
however, only for the proposition that corporations formed under German
law have the power to enter, as a general partner, into a German limited
6. K. SCHMIDT, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 1216-17 (1986).
7. Holdheim, Aktiengesellschaft als Mitglied einer offenen Handelsgesellschaft, I HOLDHElMS WOCHENSCHRIFT FUER AKTIENRECHT UND BANKWESEN 195, 195 (1892).
8. Handelsgesetzbuch [HGB] (German Commercial Code) § 161(l) (1985). For an English
translation of the Code, see M. PELTZER & J. BROOKS, GERMAN LAW PERTAINING TO
COMPANIES WITH LIMITED LIABILITY (2d ed. 1987).
9. Judgment of Feb. 16, 1912, Oberstes Landesgericht, Bavaria, 27 Die Rechtsprechung
der Oberlandesgerichte auf dem Gebiete des Zivilrechts 331 (1913).
10. Judgment of Feb. 28, 1913, Oberlandesgericht, Berlin, 18 Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung
1499, 1500 (1913).
II. Judgment of July 4, 1922, Reichsgericht [RG], W. Ger., 105 Entscheidungen des
Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen [RGZ] 101 (1922).
SPRING 1988
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partnership. The court did not have to address the complex and complicated issue of whether a foreign or a pseudo-foreign corporation has the
same power.
In the 1930s and 1940s political and economic conditions in Germany
did not lend themselves to further the development of the law of combinations of business forms. After World War 11 the picture changed. West
German courts almost uniformly followed the rule established in the German Supreme Court's opinion of 1922. The use of a corporate general
partner became extremely common in the 1960s and 1970s. Recent amendments of the German Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch)which, inter
alia, governs limited partnerships, have brought the law into line with
practice. 12 Accordingly, there can be no doubt today that a domestic
corporation may be a general partner in a limited partnership formed
under German law; provided, of course, the result of such an arrangement
is not fraudulent or potentially misleading to creditors. Although it is
presently one of the most popular forms of business association for small,
13
local businesses as well as for medium-sized enterprises in Germany,
the limited partnership with a corporate general partner (commonly referred to as GmbH & Co. KG) does not seem to have succeeded in
4
shedding its bad image as an instrumentality of potential abuse.'
I.

The Pseudo-Foreign Corporation:
A Potential General Partner?

In the early 1980s some German limited partnerships began to utilize
foreign, rather than domestic, corporations as general partners. Such an
arrangement can offer critical advantages. For example, a limited partnership formed under the German Commercial Code with a foreign corporate general partner does not seem to be subject to Germany's Codetermination Act of 1976.15 Also, while German law prohibits a corpo12. See HGB §§ 19(5), 125a, 129a, 130a, 130b, 172(6), 172a, 177a(1985). See also Judgment
of Sept. 28, 1955, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 10 WERTPAPIER-MITTEILUNGEN 61 (1956)
(holding that a German corporation may be a general partner of a German limited partnership); Judgment of Aug. 3, 1971, Landgericht (District Court), Bremen, 26 BETRIEBSBERATER 1121 (1971) (holding that a limited partnership with a corporate general partner
may enter, as a general partner, into a limited partnership).
13. The Unternehmensrechtskommission, a corporate law revision commission appointed
by the Federal Minister of Justice, estimated that, in 1980, there were more than 40,000
limited partnerships with a corporate general partner in Germany. See BERICHT UEBER DIE
VERHANDLUNGEN DER UNTERNEHMENSRECHTSKOMMISSION
at 825 (Bundesminister der Justiz
ed. 1980). In the same year, there were 2128 public corporations (Aktiengesellschaften) and
324,773 limited liability companies (Gesellschaften mit beschraenkter Haftung) in Germany.
See K. SCHMIDT, supra note 6, at 582, 744.
14. K. SCHMIDT, supra note 6, at 1218-21.
15. See Grossfeld, Die auslaendische juristische Person & Co. KG, 6 PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS 351, 351 (1986). For comments on the
VOL. 22, NO. I
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ration from transacting any business or incurring any indebtedness without
a minimum paid in capital or other assets worth DM 25,000,16 the corporation statutes of many other EEC Member States have no minimum
capitalization requirements. Not surprisingly, therefore, many corporate
lawyers and their clients view certain foreign corporations as an attractive
alternative to the German limited liability company (GmbH). Although
other jurisdictions may offer similar advantages, England has become the
home of numerous so-called "nonresident limited companies," which are
created solely to operate a limited partnership on the Continent. Private
incorporation services continually attempt to attract even more business.
A.

CHOICE OF CORPORATE LAW

The new trend in business organizations, however, has been facing a
major obstacle: according to a well-established German rule of conflict
of laws, the internal affairs of a company are ordinarily governed by the
law of the state in which the company has its seat, that is, its principal
place of business. 17 Unlike English' 8 and American' 9 laws which, as a
general rule, defer to the law of the state of incorporation, German courts
recognize an entity's legal status as a corporation only if it is incorporated
under the laws of the state where its commercial activities are carried on.
Hence, companies formed outside of Germany that have their principal
place of business in Germany, lack corporate status and, consequently,
the capacity to be a general partner in a limited partnership.

Codetermination Act in English see, e.g., Hopt, New Ways in Corporate Governance:
European Experiments with Labor Representation on Corporate Boards, 82 MICH L. REV.
1338 (1984); Mertens & Schanze, The German Codetermination Act of 1976, 2 J. COMP.
CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 75 (1979); Wiedemann, Codetermination by Workers in German
Enterprises, 28 AM. J. CoMp. L. 79 (1980). For analyses of the pros and cons of union
representation on corporate boards in the United States, see Comment, An Economic and
Legal Analysis of Union Representation on Corporate Board of Directors, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 919 (1982); Note, Serving two Masters: Union Representation on Corporate Boards
of Directors, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 639 (1981).
16. GmbH-Gesetz (German Limited Liability Company Act) § 7(2) (1986).
17. See, e.g., Judgment of March 21, 1986, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 97 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 269, 271 (1986). See also B. GROSSFELD, INTERNATIONALES UNTERNEHMENSRECHT 21-22 (1986).
18. See J. MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 443-50 (3d ed. 1984); G. CHESHIRE & P.
NORTH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

188-92 (P. North, 10th ed. 1979).

19. See DeMott, Perspectives on Choice of Law for Corporate InternalAffairs, 48

LAW

& CONTEMP. PROBS. 161 (1985); Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 DUKE
L. J. I; E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 883-914 (1982); see also REV. UNIFORM
LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 901 (1985); REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT. § 15.05(c) (1984).
For an excellent analysis of the origins of the "internal affairs" rule, see Buxbaum, The
Origins of the American "Internal Affairs" Rule in the Corporate Conflict of Laws, in
FESTSCHRIFT FUER GERHARD KEGEL 75 (H.-J. Musielak & K. Schurig eds. 1987).
SPRING 1988
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The reference to the law of the seat is based upon the theory that a
company should be subject to local law and should not have any competitive advantages over domestic companies simply because it is incorporated under the more permissive or liberal rules of a foreign country,
when the law of the principal place of business imposes stringent requirements for the benefit of shareholders, employees, and creditors. Such a
rule, or course, is very unsettling to many corporate attorneys and their
clients as it hinders the exportation of liberality from one EEC Member
State to another. It is no wonder, therefore, that the validity of the seat
rule has been questioned in view of the freedom of establishment provi20
sions of articles 52 and 58 of the EEC Treaty.
B.

THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW

To what extent, if any, do articles 52 and 58 limit a Member State's
control over foreign corporations? More precisely, does the seat rule,
which is applied by numerous Continental European countries, 2 1 remain
valid within the European Communities, in the sense that officers and
shareholders of a corporation are entitled to claim limited liability and
that the corporation has the power to enter, as a general partner, into a
limited partnership existing under the laws of another EEC Member State,
only if the corporation has its principal place of business in the state of
incorporation; or do articles 52 and 58 of the EEC Treaty require the
Member States mutually to recognize the corporations existing under their
respective laws, no matter where they have their principal place of business?
The law of the Member States must not contravene the EEC Treaty;
provided, the pertinent Treaty provisions are directly applicable. 22 Rey-

20. See, e.g., C. VON BAR, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT: ALLGEMEINE LEHREN 15758 (1987); Deville, Anmerkung, 32 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 298 (1986);
Niessen, Niederlassungsrecht von Gesellschaften nach den Regeln des europaeischen Gemeinschaftsrechts, 39 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1408 (1986); I H. WIEDEMANN,
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 793-96 (1980).
Contra C. EBENROTH, DIE VERDECKTEN VERMOEGENSZUWENDUNGEN
IM TRANSNATIONALEN UNTERNEHMEN 374 (1979); Ebke, supra note 1,
at 249-69; Grossfeld, supra note 17, at 39-40; Grossfeld & Ebke, Strukurprinzipien des
deutschen Rundfunks and privatrechtliche Organisationsformen im EG-Bereich, in SATELLITENFERNSEHEN UND DEUTSCHES RUNDFUNKSYSTEM 29, 53 (H. Huebner, D. Oehler &
K. Stern eds. 1983); Hahn & Swoboda, Englische "Limited Company" statt GmbH ?, 75
GMBH-RUNDSCHAU 85, 86 (1984); PALANDT, BUERGERLICHES GESETZBUCH Anh. zu EGBGB
12 Anm. 6, at 2204 (46th ed. 1987).
21. E.g., Austria, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Turkey; contra Great
Britain, Italy and The Netherlands (state of incorporation).
22. Ebke, Enforcement Techniques within the European Communities: Flying Close to
the Sun with Waxen Wings, 50 J. AIR L. & COM. 685, 705-06 (1985), revised and reprinted
in
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ners v. Belgium is the leading case in which the European Court of Justice
stated that article 52 of the EEC Treaty is directly applicable. 23 This
holding has no bearing on article 58, however. 24 As of February 1, 1987,
the Court of Justice has interpreted article 58 of the EEC Treaty in only
two cases, both of which dealt with discrimination against foreign corporations rather than legal restrictions or restraints in fact on the right of
establishment. In the first case, the court, without any explanation, treated
article 58 as directly applicable Community law. 25 The decision in the
second case is also based upon the theory that article 58 can be invoked
by private parties. 26 The court's assumption may appear questionable
considering that so far Member States have been unable to harmonize
their company laws pursuant to article 54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty. The
Court of Justice has repeatedly held, however, that the direct effect of a
Treaty provision does not depend upon whether the provision in question
has in fact been implemented by secondary Community law, such as a
directive.
Article 58, nevertheless, may be an exception to the general rule. The
EEC Treaty itself provides in its article 220 that:
Member States shall, in so far as necessary, engage in negotiations with each

other with a view ensuring for the benefit of their nationals: ...
- the mutual recognition of companies within the meaning of Article 58, second paragraph, the maintenance of their legal personality in cases where the
registered office is transferred from one country to another, and the possibility
for companies subject to the municipal law of different Member States to form

mergers; ... 27
In 1968 the original six members of the EEC signed the Convention Concerning the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Legal Persons; the
Convention is supplemented by a Protocol giving the Court of Justice
jurisdiction to interpret the Convention. 2 8 Neither the Convention nor the
Protocol are, as yet, in force for lack of ratification by the Netherlands.
The question whether article 58 of the EEC Treaty, apart from the Convention, demands that Member States recognize the legal status of another
23. Reyners v. Belgium, Case 2/74, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 631, 650, [1974 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8256.
24. Cf. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518
(1978).
25. Commission v. France, Case 270/83, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
, [1986] Common Mkt. Rpt. (CCH) 14,282. For the facts of this case see infra text accompanying note
35.
26. In re Centrale Raad van Beroep, Case 79/85, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
[1987] Common Mkt. Rpt. (CCH)
14,358. This case deals with a Dutch health insurance
law that denied presidents of foreign companies insurance benefits that were available to

presidents of Dutch companies.
27. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, article 220.
28. B. GROSSFELD, supra note 17, at 40.
SPRING 1988
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Member State's companies, is the subject of considerable debate. Article
220 of the EEC Treaty provides that the Member States act "in so far as
necessary." 29 This language may be interpreted as qualifying the Member
States' obligations under article 58 of the EEC Treaty, in the sense that,
because of the complexity and difficulties of the recognition issue, solution
of the problem should await the concerted action of all of the Member
States.
The recently enacted Private International Law Act of the Federal Republic of Germany 30 seems to support this view. The Act does not contain
a rule concerning the choice of corporate law, because the legislators did
not want to anticipate activities on the Community level. 31 The EEC
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations of 1980
does not deal with the choice of corporate law either. 32 Although the
Convention does not expressly refer to article 220 of the EEC Treaty, it
can be considered as a natural addition 33 to the 1968 EEC Convention
on Judicial Competence and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, which is based on article 220 of the EEC Treaty.
Consequently, the EEC Member States themselves appear to be of the
opinion that article 220(3), rather than article 58, of the EEC Treaty is
the lex specialis. Recognition, by a Member State, of another Member
State's companies thus would seem to depend upon the 1968 Recognition
Convention coming into force.
Some commentators have argued, however, that, in light of its legislative
history, article 220(3) of the EEC Treaty does not intend to qualify the
Member States' duties under article 58 of the EEC Treaty, and that article
58 demands that the legal status of companies existing under the laws of
an EEC Member State be recognized, regardless of the 1968 Recognition
Convention. 34 The Court of Justice has not yet had an opportunity to
rule on this issue. In a recent case, however, the court has dealt with the
relationship between article 52 and article 220(2) of the EEC Treaty. In
that case, the defendant French Government argued that a section of the
French tax code, which denied certain foreign insurance companies a tax
29.
30.
31.
(Oct.

EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 220.
Bundesgesetzblatt BGBI. (German Official Gazette) 1 1142 (1986).
See 296 Bundestagsdrucksachen (German Parliamentary Documents) 10/504, at 84
20, 1983).

32. For details of the Convention see, e.g., Weintraub, How to Choose Law ForContracts

and How Not to: The EEC Convention, 17 TEX. INT'L L.J. 155 (1982); Williams, The EEC
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 35 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 1

(1986).
33. See 296 Bundestagsdrucksachen (Germany Parliamentary Documents) 10/503, at 21
(Oct. 20, 1983).
34. See, e.g., A. BLECKMANN, EUROPARECHT 336, 347 (4th ed. 1985); U. EVERLING, DAS
NIEDERLASSUNGSRECHT IM GEMEINSAMEN MARKT 35 (1963).
VOL. 22, NO. I
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credit granted to French insurers, did not violate the EEC Treaty because
the tax treatment of the foreign taxpayers resulted from a double tax

treaty that was expressly recognized by article 220(2) of the EEC Treaty.
The court gave the defendant's argument short shrift. In the court's opinion, article 52 of the EEC Treaty, apart from article 220(2), requires that
the tax laws of an EEC Member State be applied to nationals of another
EEC Member State in a nondiscriminatory manner. 35 In another recent
case, the European Court of Justice held that the EEC Treaty's general
antidiscrimination clause of article 7 is fully applicable despite the failure
36
of the Member States to comply with article 220(1) of the EEC Treaty.
Although they are not directly on point, each of these opinions is a particular illustration of the weight the court puts on the freedom of establishment and its role in the process of establishing a common market
within the European Communities.
C.

NON-DISCRIMINATION AND NATIONAL TREATMENT

Assuming that article 58 of the EEC Treaty is in fact directly applicable,
we then reach the question of whether a Member State, under the EEC
Treaty, may restrict a company's freedom of establishment by requiring
that companies with their principal place of business in a Member State
other than the state of incorporation be incorporated under the laws of
the state of the principal place of business. The Court of Justice has not
yet addressed this issue.
The court, however, has dealt with the problem of legal or actual restraints of comparable fundamental rights granted by the EEC Treaty,
38
such as the free movement of goods 37 and the free movement of services
provisions of the Treaty. The case law under article 30 of the EEC Treaty,
dealing with the free movement of goods within the Community, is particularly well-developed. 39 In article 30 cases, the court applies a "rule
of strict necessity," which was established in the seminal Cassis de Dijon
case. 40 According to this rule, article 30 of the EEC Treaty permits restraints on the free movement of goods, other than those based upon
article 36 of the Treaty, which are designed to serve certain goals, if they
are applied in a nondiscriminatory manner to both domestic and foreign

35. See 32 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 739, 740-41 (1986).

36. In re Robert Heinrich Maria Mutsch, Case 137/84, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
1 [1986] Common Mkt. Rpt. (CCH) 14,221.
37. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 30-37.

38.
39.
40.
Ct. J.

EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 59-66.
See I H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 2, at 2-126-32.6.
Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesverwaltungsmonopol fuer Branntwein, 1979 E. Comm.
Rep. 649, 662, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rpt. (CCH) 8543.
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products. The main, though sometimes unstated, criterion seems to be
whether the national restriction in question genuinely serves the purpose
of protecting consumers, preventing unfair competition, or the like, or
whether it attempts to help domestic producers at the expense of their
foreign competitors. 4 1 Some of the court's opinions dealing with a natural
person's right of establishment under article 52 of the EEC Treaty seem
to suggest that the strict necessity test applies to restrictions under article
52 as well; 42 provided, of course, the Member State applies the restriction
in a nondiscriminatory way to both its own citizens and the citizens of
43
other EEC Member States.
Probably the most important case for our purposes is Commission 44
v.
FederalRepublic of Germany, which was decided on December 4, 1986.
This case concerns German "qualification requirements" imposed on foreign insurance companies to protect local policy holders. The requirements allegedly violated the free movement of services provisions of the
EEC Treaty. In its well-balanced opinion, the court made it perfectly clear
that articles 59(1) and 60 of the EEC Treaty permit restrictions on the
free movement of services within the Community, if these four requirements are met: (1) The national measure in question is strictly necessary
in the public interest of the forum; (2) the state of incorporation does not
provide similar safeguards; (3) the measure concerned is reasonable; and
(4) the measure is applied in a nondiscriminatory manner to both domestic
and foreign companies. 45 Assuming this test is also applicable to restraints
of a company's right of establishment under article 58 of the EEC Treaty,
it seems fair to conclude that Germany's incorporation requirement is
compatible with the legislative jurisdiction of any Member State to regulate the business carried on within its borders.
The seat rule is not discriminatory. The law treats foreign corporations
having their principal place of business in Germany in the same way as
domestic corporations having their principal place of business outside of
Germany.4 6 In neither event will German courts recognize the entity as
a valid corporation. Consequently, a choice of law principle such as the
seat rule, which does not differentiate on the grounds of the nationality
of a company, can hardly be a denial of equal treatment of the laws.
41. See I H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 2, at 2-132.3.
42. See, e.g., In re Debauve, Case 52/79, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J.
1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rpt. (CCH) $ 8661.
43. Fearson and Co. v. The Irish Land Commission, Case 182/83,
Rep. 3677, 3685-86, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rpt.
44. Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case 205/84, 1986
[19871 Common Mkt. Rpt. (CCH) $ 14,339.
45. See 37 VERSICHERUNGSRECHT

Rep. 833, 856, [19791984 E. Comm. Ct. J.
(CCH) $ 14,126.
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A more complicated issue is whether the incorporation requirement is
strictly necessary to protect the public interest of the forum. There can
be no doubt that the public interest is at stake. Ownership of corporate
stock as well as working for and doing business with corporations are not
only of private interest, but are mass phenomena that deserve the attention
of the public at large.
Some will nevertheless wonder whether the requirement that corporations adhere to stringent local rules aimed at the protection of shareholders, creditors, and employees of corporations, is strictly necessary.
Some may be tempted to argue that the decision of private persons to
incorporate or reincorporate their business under the laws of an EEC
Member State with a permissive corporation law maximizes the shareholders' joint welfare. A similar view was expressed recently in the United
States by Professor Fischel. 47 Citing the empirical study of economists
Peter Dodd and Richard Leftwich, 48 Professor Fischel argues that there
is no empirical evidence of any negative market reaction either before or
after a management's decision to reincorporate a corporation in Delaware,
a state that, partly because of the liberal construction of its corporation
statute by judicial decisions, has been the mecca of a large number of
American corporations 49since Delaware's corporation statute was first
"modernized" in 1899.
Professor Fischel's assumption that the stock market is efficient in that
it reflects, without delay, all available information about a firm's securities,
is far from certain, however. In addition, Professor Fischel seems to
overlook that corporations with large numbers of diffuse shareholders
normally tend to incorporate in the "liberal" states such as Delaware,
whereas corporations with more concentrated shareholders tend to incorporate in the "strict" states, 50 of which California and Texas are examples. Most, if not all of the large publicly held corporations in the
United States are subject to the federal law of corporations, which is
based upon two New Deal era statutes, the Securities Act of 193351 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.52 These statutes were a response
to the perceived inadequacies of state regulation. 53 Although these stat-

47. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments
in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913 (1982).
48. Dodd & Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Competition"
versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980).
49. H. HENN, CORPORATIONS 82-83 (2d ed. 1986).
50. See Baysinger & Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm, 28
J. LAW & ECON. 179 (1985).
51. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a et seq.
52. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a et seq.
53. R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 154.
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utes do not create a pervasive scheme of federal regulation, federal courts
have gradually expanded the federal law in order to protect shareholders
and potential investors. The insider trading law, 54 the federal tender offer
legislation, 55 the federal proxy regulation, 56 and the emerging duties of
directors and auditors under rule lOb-5 57 illustrate the effectiveness of
the federal regulation and its significance for the corporate governance
system. Thus, the perceived liberality of Delaware's corporation law is,
at least in part, counterbalanced by the stringency of the federal regulation. This equilibrium remains in force despite several restrictive United
States Supreme Court opinions since 1975 that appear to have halted the
trend toward the federalization of the law of corporations.
Whatever the merits of Professor Fischel's thesis, it would be incorrect
to suggest that it could be used to support the proposition that a conflict
principle that hinders the exportation of liberality within the European
Communities, is necessarily bad for shareholders and thus not in their
best interest. On the Community level no body of law presently exists
that is comparable to the stringent United States federal securities regulation. Consequently, the protection of shareholders and potential investors remains the primary responsibility of the EEC Member States so
long as the harmonization of the company laws, as envisioned by article
54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty, is more a myth than reality. And the same is
true with regard to the protection of employees and creditors; their interests can be protected adequately only if the Member States continue
to regulate the business that is being carried on within their borders.
If we assume that the incorporation requirement of German law is in
fact strictly necessary in the public interest, we then reach the final question as to whether the incorporation requirement is in itself reasonable.
In my view, the requirement is reasonable as at the present time no less
stringent, yet equally effective way of protecting shareholders, employees, and creditors is in sight within the European Communities. In particular, the approach taken by the New York Business Corporation Law58
and California's General Corporation Law, imposing on pseudo-foreign
corporations some of their own corporate law provisions "to the exclusion

54. See T. Hazen, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 480-92 (1985); L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 604-44 (1983).
55. See T. HAZEN, supra note 54, at 348-64; see also E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G.
BERLSTEIN,

DEVELOPMENTS

56. See R.

IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL

CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 366-74 (1986); H.
OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 813-23

(1977).

& J. ALEXANDER,
(1983 & Supp. 1986).
HENN

LAWS

57. Ebke, In Search of Alternatives: Comparative Reflections on Corporate Governance
and the Independent Auditor's Responsibilities, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 663 (1984).
58. See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1316-1320 (McKinney).
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of the law of the jurisdiction in which it is incorporated," 59 does not seem
at present to be a practicable alternative. 60 Unlike in the United States,
in the European Communities the structural differences that exist among
the various Member States' forms of corporate entities are fundamental. 6 1
Thus, for example, it would be impossible for Germany to apply her Codetermination Act to an affected pseudo-foreign corporate general partner, such as an English limited company that has most or all of its assets
and shareholders in Germany, because most foreign companies do not
have a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat)within which, according to German law, the participation of employee representatives is to be effectuated. 62 The inevitable conclusion is, therefore, that, so long as the
Member States of the EEC fail to harmonize their company laws in accordance with the mandates of article 54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty, every
Member State is entitled, under the EEC Treaty, to require that all companies operating principally within its borders, incorporate under its laws.
III. The Foreign Corporation:
A Potential General Partner?
Where does this conclusion leave us with respect to genuine foreign
companies: companies that have their principal place of business in the
state of incorporation and seek to enter, as a general partner, into a limited
partnership existing under the laws of another Member State of the EEC?
The Court of Civil Appeals of Bavaria suggests that, in such a case,
63
German law permits the combination of business forms in question. It
is true that in this admittedly rather hypothetical case German conflict
principles would seem to cause no problems, as German courts do recognize genuine foreign corporations as "corporations;" provided, of

59. See

CAL. CORP. CODE

§ 2115 (West). The constitutionality of § 2115 is the subject

of considerable debate. See Buxbaum, The Application of California Corporation Law to
Pseudo Foreign Corporations, 4 CAL. Bus. L. REP. 109 (1983); Buxbaum, The Threatened

Constitutionalization of the Internal Affairs Doctrine in Corporation Law, 75

CALIF.

L.

REV. 29 (1987); DeMott, supra note 19; L. SOLOMON, R. STEVENSON & D. SCHWARTZ,
CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY 124-25 (1982).
60. But see Sandrock, Ein amerikanisches Lehrstueckfaer das Kollisionsrecht der Kapitalgesellschaften, 42 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FUER AUSLAENDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES
PRIVATRECHT 227 (1978).
61. See, e.g., Conard, The Supervision of Corporate Management: A Comparison of
Developments in European Community and United States Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1459
(1984); Grossfeld & Ebke, Controlling the Modern Corporation: A Comparative View of
Corporate Power in the United States and Europe, 26 AM. J. CoMp. L. 397, 398-421 (1978);
Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspectives from the German, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 23 (1966).
62. Grossfeld & Ebke, supra note 61, at 398-409, 427-30.
63. Judgment of March 21, 1986, Oberstes Landesgericht, Bavaria, 1986 Bay. OGLZ 61,

68 & 70.
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course, the corporation in question meets all of the incorporation requirements of the state of incorporation. That does not necessarily mean,
however, that the arrangement under discussion is permissible under the
corporation and limited partnership statutes of the jurisdictions concerned. Some jurisdictions continue to prohibit the use of any corporate
general partner in limited partnerships. 64 Thus, a corporation existing
under the laws of such a jurisdiction cannot claim to be entitled to enter,
as a general partner, into a limited partnership outside of that jurisdiction,
since a company cannot have more rights abroad than it has under the
laws of the jurisdiction to which it owes its corporate existence. If, in a
given case, there is no such restriction, the question then is whether the
corporation and limited partnership statutes of the jurisdiction under the
laws of which the limited partnership is formed permit the entering of a
65
foreign corporate general partner.
The pertinent German statutes are politely silent on the issue. The Court
of Civil Appeals of Bavaria, in the Druckhaus Landshut case, suggested,
however, that section 5(2) of the German Capital Transfer Tax Act (Kapitalverkehrssteuergesetz) supports the view that at least those companies
that are incorporated under the laws of an EEC Member State may be
used as a corporate general partner in a German limited partnership. 6 6 It
is correct that, according to section 5(2), those companies may be subject
to Germany's capital transfer tax; section 5(2) does not, however, turn
on the permissibility of combinations of business forms. This follows from
section 39(2), 40, and 41(1) of the German Tax Code (Abgabenordnung),
which state that the government may levy taxes regardless of whether
the underlying transaction is legally valid. The Court of Civil Appeals of
Bavaria also pointed to the legislative history of the Co-determination Act
of 1976, which, according to the court, shows that the legislators were
aware of the possibility of a foreign corporation entering into a domestic
limited partnership as a general partner. 67 It is certainly correct to assume
that the legislators were "aware" of the current trends in business organizations; yet, that does not necessarily mean they approved of each
and all of them. The legislative history supports the proposition that
German co-determination law does not apply to German limited partnerships where the only general partner is a foreign corporation. By ex64. See, e.g., Obligationenrecht (Law of Obligations) art. 594(2) of Switzerland, which
is not a member of the EEC, however. Similar restrictions have been applied by Italian
courts. See I G. ALESSI, B. MANZELLA & P. MARINO, LE SOCIETA 479-82 (1976).
65. Grossfeld, supra note 15, at 353.
66. Judgment of March 21, 1986, Oberstes Landesgericht, Bavaria, 1986 Bay. OLGZ 61,
68-69.
67. Judgment of March 21, 1986, Oberstes Landesgericht, Bavaria, 1986, Bay. OLGZ 61,
69.
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empting them the legislators, however, did not, even implicitly, recognize
such combinations of business forms; for it can hardly be assumed that
the legislators intended to include, in the parliamentary documents, a
hidden hint as to how companies concerned can avoid the participation
of workers in the decision-making process of their enterprise.
The question of whether a genuine foreign corporate general partner
can be used, thus appears to be ultimately a question of public policy. As
previously stated, the combination of business forms causes very difficult
problems. From the standpoint of shareholders, creditors, and employees
it is potentially dangerous to permit the combining of companies that exist
under different countries' laws fundamentally different from each other.
In this respect whether the foreign corporation is a pseudo-foreign or a
genuine foreign company makes no difference. It cannot be the purpose
of the freedom of establishment provisions of the EEC Treaty to enable
companies to circumvent mandatory laws of the principal place of business
at the expense of shareholders, creditors, and employees. For the time
being, the seat rule therefore seems to be compatible with the EEC Treaty.
IV. Conclusion
While the EEC Member States share the same or at least similar values
with the United States, legal approaches that produce legally sound and
economically efficient solutions in the United States do not necessarily
lead to desirable results in Europe. This is particularly true with regard
to the choice of corporate law. In light of the constitutional setting, the
partial federalization of the corporation law, and the pseudo-foreign corporation doctrine, American courts can afford to apply the "liberal" state
of incorporation conflict principle. Within the European Communities, a
solution to the conceptual problems discussed in this article depends upon
the harmonization of the EEC Member States' laws of business associations, as mandated by article 54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty. So long as the
Member States' laws of business associations lack at least a certain degree
of uniformity, the Member States appear to be permitted under the EEC
Treaty to exercise full legislative jurisdiction over foreign corporations.
Consequently, the Member States should do whatever they can to accelerate the process of harmonization of their laws of business associations. Such harmonization is of vital importance if a common market is
to be established within the European Communities.
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